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It is such an honor to speak to you, especially since compared to the
titans who have given the Schwartz Lecture in the past, I feel like an ADR
manqu6. I am going to proceed, nonetheless, and discuss the impact of
counteroffers on negotiation. And I am going to try to convince you of four
central claims:
* Legal claim: The counteroffer is governed by what I will call the
"blow-up rule," which is a rare kind of double-jointed default.
* Informational claim: Offerees are the first people to know when
there are gains of trade.
* Channeling claim: The blow-up rule dampens the incentive of
offerees to inefficiently counter.
* Psychological claim: Rejection aversion and other behavioral
"biases" tend to cause people to reject offers too often.
These counteroffer claims join together two disparate obsessions that I
have with legal default rules and information forcing. The last claim even
gives me a chance to indulge my penchant for why-not experimentation,'
where I have tried to put into practice the never-say-no attitude.
After an offeree hears an offer, there are basically three things she can
do. She can accept, counter, or reject the offer. One way to restate what I am
saying here is to reformulate the foregoing four claims in terms of these three
possible offeree reactions. I am going to suggest that there are too many
counteroffers relative to acceptances. Secondly, I am going to suggest that
there are too few counteroffers relative to rejections. Another way to put this
is that the ratio of counteroffers to acceptances is too high and that the ratio
of counteroffers to rejections is too low.
* Based on the Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution, delivered at The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law on April 2, 2009.
1 BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: How TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY
TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL (2006).
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Tripartite Response
Too Many Counters
Vs.
Accept
Too Few Counters
Vs.
Reject
I will try to convince you that the tendency of offerees to inefficiently
counter when they should accept is a consequence of my informational
claim, and the tendency of offerees to inefficiently reject when they should
counter is a consequence of my psychological claim. I should hasten to add
that these efficiency claims are from the limited ex post perspective-taking
the offer as given. Ultimately, I will argue that from a more dynamic, ex ante
perspective, we may want some amount of ex post inefficiency in
counteroffers to discipline offerors to make better offers to begin with.
I. LEGAL CLAIM: THE COUNTEROFFER BLOW-UP RULE IS A RARE KIND
OF DOUBLE-JOINTED DEFAULT
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 39(2) describes a central
attribute of counteroffers, namely that "[a]n offeree's power of acceptance is
terminated by his making of a counter-offer. .. ."2 I will refer to this as the
blow-up rule because it establishes that a counteroffer metaphorically blows
up prior offers so that legally they no longer exist. But what really fascinates
me is what comes after the ellipse. Section 39(2) states in full that "[a]n
offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by his making of a counter-offer,
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(2) (1981).
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unless the offeror has manifested a contrary intention or unless the counter-
offer manifests a contrary intention of the offeree."3
The first of these "unless" clauses is unexceptional. The blow-up rule is a
default governing the formation of the contract; like other formation
defaults,4 it can be contracted around by one side of the potential contract. It
should not be surprising that the offeror, as master of the offer, is able to
change the conditions of acceptance. The offeror can unilaterally contract
around the default that "an offer invites acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances" 5 by unambiguously indicating that
the offer can only be accepted in a particular way, such as by skywriting, "I
accept." Thus, if Smirgo offers to sell Bisko an oven for $1,000, and in
making the offer indicates that it intends the offer to survive any
counteroffer, then Bisko can counteroffer to buy for $700 and subsequently
accept Smirgo's original $1,000 offer.6
The second "unless" clause is, however, surprising. On its face, it gives
the counterofferor the ability to make a counteroffer without blowing up her
right to subsequently accept the original offer. I refer to the blow-up rule as a
double-jointed default because it allows either the offeree or the offeror to
unilaterally displace the rule. But what happens if the offeror and the offeree
manifest different intentions about blowing up the original offer? For
example, imagine that Smirgo says to Bisko, "I offer to sell you an oven for
$100,000, and I intend for your power of acceptance to terminate if you make
a counteroffer." Bisko responds by saying, "I offer to buy an oven from you
for $70,000, and in making this counteroffer, I intend to retain my power to
accept your $100,000 offer."
If Bisko follows up by saying, "I accept your $100,000 offer," has a
contract been formed? I think the answer is slightly unclear. On its face,
section 39(2)7 seems to indicate, via the second "unless" clause, that a
contract has been formed. But I tend to think that an offeror, as master of the
offer, would be able to condition acceptance on the non-occurrence of a
counteroffer before acceptance. If this is true, the blow-up rule represents one
3 Id. (emphasis added).
4 See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy
of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489 (1989) (discussing the use of default and background
rules in contract law).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30(2).
6 The terms Smirgo and Bisko (whose first-letters helpfully correspond to "seller"
and "buyer") and the oven selling hypothetical come from my recently departed coauthor,
Richard Speidel. See IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (7th
ed. 2008).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(2).
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of the few instances where a contracting party has a legal reason to reiterate a
default. While reiterating or restating the blow-up rule in your offer is
seemingly redundant, doing so may remove the offeree's power to
unilaterally contract around it. From the offeree's perspective, an offeror
reiterating the blow-up rule might transform the rule from a default to a
mandatory rule, in that it removes the offeree's option to opt out.8 Indeed,
one could imagine nine different permutations of offeror and offeree
remaining silent about survivability, or unilaterally indicating an intent that
the initial offer will survive or terminate after a counteroffer.
Predicted Legal Treatment of Nine Different Permutations of Intent
Indications or Silence
Offeror Statement of Intent
Survive Silence Terminate
Offeree Survive Survive Survive Terminate?
Statement of Silent Survive Terminate Terminate
Intent Terminate Terminate? Terminate Terminate
As indicated in this table, it is also uncertain what would happen if a
Bisko offer indicated an intent to have power of acceptance survive any
counteroffer, but Smirgo's counteroffer indicated an intent to have its power
of acceptance terminate. Again, notwithstanding the operation of the first
unless clause of section 39(2),9 I tend to think that courts would not find
formation in a subsequent attempted acceptance of the original offer. In part
because the offeree is master of his or her rejection, the offeree who chooses
to reject and counter should have the right to terminate her own future power
of acceptance. But the big news of this section is that the blow-up rule is an
unusual default rule because either the offeree or the offeror can unilaterally
contract around it, and because the offeror who likes the default may have
some incentive to expressly reiterate it in making the original offer.
II. INFORMATIONAL CLAIM: OFFEREES ARE THE FIRST PEOPLE TO
KNOW WHEN THERE ARE GAINS OF TRADE
If you are obsessed with defaults, the blow-up rule will hold your
attention. But you might be asking yourself what the heck this has to do with
8 I thank Wendy Zupac for this point and more generally my 2009 contracts class for
helping me think through this issue.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(2).
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ADR and negotiations. An important step in that direction is to lay out a very
simple, but overlooked, informational asymmetry between offerors and
offerees.
Imagine that our friends Smirgo and Bisko are negotiating whether
Smirgo will manufacture a new kind of flash oven for Bisko. Both
negotiating parties have privately known reservation prices: Smirgo has a
minimum amount that it needs to make the manufacturing worthwhile, and
Bisko has a maximum amount that it is willing to pay. Integrative
bargaining-where parties search for bigger gains of trade-is of course
important too, but in this hypothetical, the parties are engaged in
distributional bargaining where they are trying to figure out how to split
fixed gains of trade.10 Because their reservation prices are initially private,
they are uncertain whether there are in fact gains of trade.
Imagine in this negotiation that you are Bisko and that Smirgo moves
first and offers to sell you a flash oven for $80,000. My very simple point is
that you, as the offeree, are in one of two very different informational
positions. Either you know that your reservation price overlaps with the
offered price, or you know that it does not. If your reservation price as a
buyer is above $80,000, then you know there are gains of trade. Because
Smirgo is willing to offer to sell at $80,000, you know that its reservation
price is less than or equal to $80,000. Your reservation price overlaps the
offer in the sense that you know there are a range of prices between the
offered price and your reservation price that would be mutually beneficial. If
your reservation price is above $80,000, then the moment you hear the offer,
you know that there are gains of trade. If this is true, you as the offeree are
the first person in the universe to know this socially valuable piece of
information because no one else, including Smirgo at the moment of its offer,
is privy to your reservation price.
The inverse, however, is not true. If your reservation price does not
overlap with the offered price-your reservation price is less than $80,000-
then you cannot conclude that there are not gains of trade. For example, if
your reservation price as a potential buyer is $75,000 and you hear an offer to
sell at $80,000, it is possible that there are still gains of trade and that the
offer does not overlap with your reservation price merely because the seller's
10 ROGER FISHER, ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 56-72 (2d ed. 1991); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND
STRATEGY 34-35, 184 (2002). The idea that integrative or interest-based bargaining will
always include distributive bargaining too was originally put forth in DAVID A. LAX &
JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION
AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 119-21 (1986).
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self-engrossing offer exceeds his or her reservation. A deal might still be
struck at a lower price of, say, $72,000.
This simple example suggests that although offerees have three possible
responses to an offer-to accept, to reject, or to counteroffer--offerees
engaged in distributive bargaining will usually have only two plausible
responses to a particular offer. For non-overlapping offers, distributive
offerees will choose between rejecting and counteroffering. For overlapping
offers, they will choose between accepting and counteroffering (and, as I will
emphasize below, for integrative bargaining, they might also counteroffer).
The informational advantage of offerees is important because, taking the
offers as given, it is socially inefficient for offerees to engage in
distributional bargaining-to make counteroffers changing the price-when
they have received an overlapping offer and already know that there are
gains of trade. The time and expense spent on additional negotiations are a
deadweight loss that do not increase the gains of trade but merely impact
how those gains are distributed. My earlier claim that there are too few
acceptances relative to counteroffers comes from the economic incentives of
offerees hearing overlapping offers to inefficiently counteroffer.
In contrast, it can be socially efficient for offerees to make counteroffers
when they receive non-overlapping offers. Counteroffers that merely alter the
price in response to a non-overlapping offer help the parties discover whether
there are gains of trade. Thus, if Smirgo offers to sell for $80,000 and
Bisko-with a private reservation price of $75,000-counteroffers at
$72,000, then Smirgo as the new offeree may be the first to learn that there
are gains of trade (for example, if Smirgo's reservation price is $60,000).
Efficiency-minded lawmakers might look for ways to encourage
counteroffers in response to non-overlapping offers but discourage
counteroffers in response to overlapping offers. This seems like a laudable
but daunting task. How can government officials with even more limited
information craft policy to encourage the right kind of counteroffers?
Surprisingly, the blow-up rule in a small way accomplishes just this result.
III. CHANNELING CLAIM: THE BLOw-UP RULE DAMPENS THE
INCENTIVE OF OFFEREES TO INEFFICIENTLY COUNTER
The simplest normative justification for the blow-up rule is as an
evidence rule to simplify and disambiguate what offers remain on the table
during a negotiation. Without the blow-up rule, a protracted negotiation with
a series of offers and counteroffers would keep alive several outstanding
offers. If a negotiator finally shouted, "I accept," it would be difficult for the
other side or for the court to know which of the previous offers was being
608
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accepted. One important benefit of the blow-up rule is that courts just need to
look at the last offer before the acceptance.
A very different kind of justification for the blow-up rule comes from
trying to craft a law that discourages counteroffers after an offeree hears an
overlapping offer without discouraging offerees from countering after
hearing a non-overlapping offer. An offeree who hears an overlapping offer
has to somewhat fear the application of the blow-up rule. For example, a
Bisko offeree, who has a $100,000 reservation price and hears an $80,000
offer to sell from Smirgo, should be worried that countering with an offer to
purchase at $70,000 will remove the valuable option to accept at $80,000.
The risk is that Smirgo will not only refuse to sell at the lower counteroffer
price but will refuse to sell at the original offer price of $80,000. In sharp
contrast, an offeree who receives a non-overlapping offer should feel no
opportunity cost of blowing up the initial offer for the simple reason that the
offeree would never want to accept that offer. A Bisko offeree with a
reservation price of $75,000 would not feel the slightest economic
disincentive to blow up the offered $80,000 price.
So voila, the blow-up rule does the seemingly impossible. Without
knowing the private valuations of the negotiators, the law can nonetheless
mildly discourage counteroffers after overlapping offers without
discouraging counteroffers after non-overlapping offers. It mildly channels
offerees who know there are gains of trade toward acceptance without
deterring the search for gains of trade that can be accomplished by
counteroffers after an offeree hears a non-overlapping offer.
I should emphasize that the dampening effect of the blow-up rule on
counteroffers after an offeree knows there are gains of trade may be quite
small. An offeree might correctly suspect that the offeror who found it
worthwhile to make an original $80,000 offer is likely to be willing to re-
offer that price even if the original offer is blown up, or is likely to be willing
to accept a subsequent counteroffer at that price. But an offeree who
subsequently offers the original price or solicits a new offer at that price
reveals that he or she had been engaging in distributive bargaining-not in
the search for greater gains of trade but merely to increase her share of the
pie. The possibility, however, that some offerors may be annoyed at an
offeree who is shown to have engaged in this behavior and refuse to contract
at the original price is likely to be enough to discourage some of the socially
inefficient distributive bargaining. The mere possibility of offeror enmity
slightly disciplines the offeree from inefficiently counteroffering merely to
gain a larger share of certain gains of trade.
Of course, the blow-up rule as we have already learned is merely a
default. Offerees can avoid the disciplining effect by exercising their option
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to keep the original offer alive notwithstanding their counteroffer. But,
during distributive bargaining, an offeree's choice to preserve the original
offer itself signals that the original offer is potentially acceptable and
therefore still dampens the likelihood that an offeree will contract around the
blow-up rule as a rational part of distributive bargaining. For example, after
Smirgo offers to sell at $80,000, then an offeree who counters at $75,000, but
adds a proviso to preserve the right to accept the $80,000 offer, strongly
signals to the seller that the offeree's reservation price is above $80,000.
Smirgo would be advised to reject the counteroffer and await the buyer's
acceptance of the original offer.
An appreciation of ADR theory, however, suggests that the blow-up
default might not be appropriate with regard to a different type of
counteroffer, which I will call an integrative counteroffer. Stepping back, a
distributive counteroffer is one where only the price term is altered to favor
the offeree. A major point of my analysis is that distributive counteroffers
can be used to discover gains of trade. An offeree who hears a non-
overlapping offer searches for gains of trade by countering at a more
favorable price. In contrast, an integrative counteroffer explores the
possibility of greater gains of trade by altering a non-price term of the
offer." Efficiency-minded lawmakers should be chary to discourage
integrative counteroffers even as a response to an overlapping offer. But by
default, the blow-up rule does just this because it renders unacceptable any
original offer after a counteroffer is made.
Appreciating the difference between integrative and distributive
bargaining, one might imagine a more limited blow-up rule, which only
operated to blow-up offers after distributive counteroffers. Thus, if Smirgo
offers to sell at $80,000, and Bisko responds with an integrative
counteroffer-for example, Bisko might counter to pay $82,000 for an oven
that added on a high-speed, convection fan-then under the alternative rule,
the original $80,000 would live for Bisko to accept. Interestingly, the
restatement has already moved a step in this direction because it empowers
an offeree to make independent offers not "relating to the same matter as the
original offer,"' 2 which do not blow up the original offer. So currently, the
line between offeree offers which blow up and offeree offers that do not blow
up turns on whether the offeree offer is independent or not. But courts might
promote efficiency by redrawing the line to turn on whether the offer by the
11 In some contexts, altering the quantity would be equivalent to altering a price
term in the sense that it would alter the unit price offered. Thus, if Smirgo offered to sell
100 ovens for a million dollars, and Bisko countered with an offer to buy 200 ovens for a
million dollars, Bisko would by my lights be making a distributive counteroffer.
12 RESTATEMEr (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(1).
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offeree was integrative or distributive. Courts have the institutional
competence to make this distinction because it simply asks whether the
offeree's offers altered non-price terms. If so, it is an integrative counteroffer
that would not render the original offer unacceptable. This definition of
integrative counteroffers would naturally subsume independent offers
because they always alter some non-price terms.
Even without altering the current blow-up rule, offerees can achieve the
same result by merely signaling that they want to retain the option of
accepting an original offer when they make an integrative counteroffer.
Offerees should feel more freedom to opt out of the blow-up rule with regard
to integrative counteroffers than with regard to distributive counteroffers. A
Bisko who counteroffers at $75,000 but tries to retain the option to buy at
$80,000 signals that its value is above $80,000. But a Bisko who
counteroffers at $82,000 with an additional convection feature while
preserving its option to buy at $80,000 is merely signaling that there might
be another contract with even larger gains of trade. Still in a world where
many bargainers forget to explore integrative bargaining, flipping the default
with regard to integrative counteroffers-exempting them by default from
the blow-up rule-might slightly promote socially beneficial integrative
bargaining.
So let us review the bidding. Strategic offerees who have heard
overlapping offers, and hence are the first to learn that there are gains of
trade, may inefficiently counteroffer to try to increase their share of gains of
trade. This is the basis for my claim that we may hear too many distributive
counteroffers relative to acceptance. The blow-up rule, as a theoretical
matter, may modestly dampen but not extinguish this effect. But the current
blow-up rule might unhelpfully dampen the willingness of offerees to make
integrative counteroffers. A slightly better default might only blow up offers
followed by distributive counteroffers but leave offers followed by
integrative counteroffers unaffected.
Before switching gears, let me emphasize that all of the foregoing
normative analysis is limited because it takes an ex-post-the-initial-offer
perspective. It takes as a given that an overlapping offer has been made. But
from an ex ante perspective it is possible that it is efficient for offerees to
bargain for a higher share of the gains of trade. For example, allowing an
offeree/seller to "piggishly" bargain for higher shares of the gains of trade
may give this potential seller better incentives to create the very asset that is
being bargained over. Indeed, the normative analysis of the last two sections
in many ways parallels the tender offer passivity debate spurred by Ron
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Gilson, Frank Easterbrook, and Dan Fischel.13 In the corporate takeover
context, when a tender offeror placed a bid to buy a firm at a 50% premium
over its current stock price, there was pretty powerful evidence that the
tender offer is overlapping. Gilson argued that offeree resistance, including
counteroffers, to these initial offers was inefficient and should be deterred.
But David Haddock, Jon Macey, and Fred McChesney, in a devastating
critique, pointed out that from an ex ante perspective, it is more ambiguous
whether promoting passive acceptance in fact promotes efficiency.14
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL CLAIM: REJECTION AVERSION AND OTHER
BEHAVIORAL "BIASES" TEND TO CAUSE PEOPLE TO REJECT NON-
OVERLAPPING OFFERS Too OFTEN
The last two sections' analysis of the blow-up rule relies on traditional
game-theoretic assumptions of hyper-rationality and narrow financial self
interest, and focused on how narrow financial self-interest might cause
offerees hearing overlapping offers to respond by inefficiently
counteroffering. In contrast, this section focuses on non-overlapping offers
and takes a more psychological approach. This section hopes to be a modest
contribution to the "barriers to negotiation" literature by focusing on a
particular moment in the negotiation process.' 5 I am interested in barriers to
counteroffering. Offerees hearing non-overlapping offers are, I conjecture,
too likely to reject-instead of more efficiently searching for gains of trade
with distributive counteroffers, integrative counteroffers, or both-because
they are likely to be subject to rejection aversion and overestimate the
offeror's reservation prices. Let me be clear that these are just conjectures
and at best set out a research agenda for future testing.
Rejection aversion is the psychological disutility some people experience
from being rejected. In addition to the wasted cost of preparing an offer and
the loss of any expected private gains from contracting, casual observation
suggests that some people dislike being turned down. Sometimes we just do
13 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194-1204
(1981). See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity
in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51-67 (1982) (arguing for a form of
limited tender offer passivity that falls short of the pure passivity advanced by
Easterbrook and Fischel).
14 David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in
Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 708-09 (1987).
15 See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS].
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not want to put ourselves out there. The rejection averse sometimes are not
willing to make initial offers. At the lecture, one of my student interlocutors
admitted that he had sometimes forgone asking somebody out on a date
because of rejection aversion. This disinclination might be even more
pronounced for offerees who are scared to counter. Electronic stores like
Circuit City and Best Buy will routinely take ten or fifteen dollars off the
posted price for a DVD player if you just ask with a counteroffer.16 But
many, many friends of mine, even armed with this information that their
counteroffer will not be rejected, still cannot bring themselves to ask. Making
a counteroffer is perceived as norm-breaking.
A second and related barrier to countering arises from some people's
tendency to overestimate the reservation price of the other side. This is
particularly likely if the offeree mistakes the other side's offer to be its
reservation terms. Mistaking offered prices for reservation prices leaves no
room for distributive bargaining. For example, if Grace offers to sell Will a
painting for $500, Will is unlikely to make a counteroffer if the most he
would pay for the painting is $200. He may feel it is not worth the trouble
because there is such a low probability that Grace would be willing to accept
an offer less than $200. This inference is strengthened by the possibility that
Grace will be embarrassed to cut her price so dramatically because Grace's
willingness to sell for less than $200 might be an indication that her initial
offer of $500 was unreasonable. Will might believe that Grace would
experience a loss of face if she cut her asking price that much.
An important face-saving technique is to point out-even manifest-
attributes of the product or service in question that would give the original
offeror a plausible excuse to substantially change her offer. For example,
Will might say, "You probably didn't realize this, but your painting doesn't
have very much yellow in it, and it might not be worth as much as you
originally thought."
At least since Getting to Yes, ADR scholars have pointed out that
negotiators miss opportunities for discovering the full gains of trade.' 7 The
small contribution of this section is to notice that the problem can infect
purely distributional bargaining where the offeree hears a non-overlapping
offer. To counteract these psychological biases, it might be useful for
offerees to develop a never-say-no impulse to pause and consider whether it
would be better to counteroffer before rejecting an offer and walking away
from a negotiation. Of course, there are some times when it is appropriate to
16 See Matt Richtel, Even at Megastores, Hagglers Find No Price Is Set in Stone,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at Al.
17 See FISHER ET AL., supra note 10, at 56-80; KOROBKIN, supra note 10, at 111-47.
See generally BARRIERS, supra note 15.
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say, "No," and break off negotiations. If both sides unthinkingly apply a
never-say-no attitude, then contexts where there are no gains of trade would
lead to an endlessly unproductive series of offers.
Moreover, the tendency of offerees to walk away from non-overlapping
offers may help discipline offerors to be less piggish when choosing an initial
price. From a truly ex ante perspective, it becomes more ambiguous whether
a just-say-no attitude to unfair offers might better promote efficiency by
prompting initial offerors to put more reasonable offers on the table to begin
with. However, this possibility is likely to be muted in contexts of one-off
bargaining or where the offeree is less able to establish a negotiation
reputation.
V. "NEVER SAY No" IN ACTION
Notwithstanding this theoretical ambiguity, I hope to convince you with
a series of real world examples that a never-say-no attitude in negotiations
can often improve your lives. In this section, I am going to talk about how I
have responded to non-overlapping offers with counteroffers that have
searched for gains of trade.
A. The ReReRescheduled Interview
In 2007, Simon Usborne, a reporter for the British newspaper, The
Independent, asked if he could interview me for an article. But when the
appointed time came, he never called. He emailed later to reschedule, but
blew me off again.' 8 When he asked to reschedule a third time, I felt a bit
like Charlie Brown being asked by Lucy to trust her and go ahead and kick
the football. But to be honest, I had a book, Super Crunchers, that I was
trying to promote, and I gamely agreed. Once again, I was left standing at the
altar. You would think this would be the end, but Simon (and this is his real
name) emailed me:
Ian,
I feel very bad for putting you off once and then mixing up the times today.
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But things are now so busy that an interview would be rushed, and I'd much
rather give it my full attention when it's less frantic. That is, of course, if
you aren't fed up with me and we can find a new time that suits you.
I'm away tomorrow and Friday. How does Tuesday 10 a.m. your time, 3
p.m. mine, sound?
Any sane person would have declined his kind offer. But I took a different
tact. I counteroffered adding in a commitment provision to try to get him to
change his low-down ways. So I emailed Simon back:
Tuesday, Sept. 4 at 10 a.m. Eastern is fine by me.
I'm not fed up. But I would appreciate trying to get it done then.
How about promising to give 50 pounds to the Multiple Sclerosis society
(my mom died of MS) if my office phone doesn't ring by 10:05?
I added the true detail about my mom to make clear that I was not
kidding. I was not willing to agree to another appointment without something
more, but the promise of my mom's charity earning some money if he
missed was enough to make it worthwhile. A minute later, he replied, "Your
phone will ring! Thanks Ian, Simon." By sticking with it, we had found a
way to go forward to schedule another interview. 19
B. A Non-Discrimination Promise and Rejection as Psychological
Palliative
In 2006, when a partner from the Watton Law Group, a small law firm in
Wisconsin, asked me for help as an economic expert on a case, I initially
thought about declining because I was fairly overcommitted on academic
projects. Indeed, after saying "no" on the phone, I caught myself and offered
to do it if the firm would promise to adopt the Fair Employment mark that
Jennifer Brown and I developed to protect workers from employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.20 Brown and I created a
certification market (recognized now by the USPTO) that firms are licensed
to use if they promise to abide by the provisions of the Employment Non-
19 You can learn more about what happened next (he did not follow through by
calling) in AYRES, supra note 18.
20 See generally Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing
Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1639 (2006) (describing the Fair Employment mark).
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Discrimination Act. Within hours, the firm had faxed in a signed copy of the
Fair Employment license and became one of the earliest adopters of the
mark. This is integrative bargaining at its best. By offering a seemingly
unrelated condition, I transformed a losing proposition into one that garnered
the eager consent of both sides.
A bigger surprise came when I tried the same tactic with UCLA law
school. I received an offer to present a paper at UCLA. I was tempted
because I have enjoyed and learned a lot from my prior visits to the school,
but I had already agreed to give several other seminars that year and the
prospect of another cross country trip away from my young kids put the
option out of the money. Instead of saying "no," I once again offered to come
if the law school would promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. In some ways, I was not asking much. UCLA already included
sexual orientation in its non-discrimination policy, and it was bound by state
law not to discriminate in employment matters on the basis of sexual
orientation. But then again, I was being high-maintenance. The professor
who invited me quite appropriately indicated that she would need to check
with her committee and get back to me.
When she called back, she indicated that the committee had decided that
it would not be right to accede to the idiosyncratic demands of individual
speakers. I responded, "I'm sorry you're turning down my offer." To which,
she paused and then responded, "Well, I'm sorry you're turning down our
offer."
The surprise here is how good I felt about the resolution, even though we
had not come to terms. Another value of the never-say-no impulse is that it
can make you feel better about a failed negotiation. Sometimes it is better to
be rejected than to merely reject. If I had simply refused UCLA's kind initial
offer, I would have felt somewhat guilty. But making a sincere, non-piggish
counteroffer substantially reduced that guilt. As our ending colloquy made
clear, we were both symmetrically rejecting each other's offer. In fact, the
UCLA professor was a bit sheepish about rejecting me because her school
was not willing to go beyond a policy to actually promise not to discriminate.
The bigger point is that one way for offerees to overcome rejection aversion
is to realize that being rejected is less painful than rejecting someone else.
Instead of rejection aversion, I now sometimes am rejection seeking as a way
of minimizing psychological discomfort.
For me, the key is that I must sincerely want to do the deal if they accede
to my demand. Sometimes, I am truly agnostic about whether my
counteroffer will be acceptable. For example, when a group of state court
judges asked me to speak at their annual conference, I said I would if the
judges would agree to anonymously participate in a social science
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experiment. In counteroffering, I was generally agnostic about whether the
judges would agree or not (as of now the answer is "no").
But there are other contexts where I sincerely counteroffer even though I
predict that the other side will almost certainly decline. For example, even
when I am busy, I almost never decline consulting work. I instead
counteroffer with exorbitant rates that would make me willing to take on the
extra work. My counteroffer is almost always rejected, but in the rare case
when it is not, I am happy to rearrange my schedule to receive the higher
salary.
I am even willing to make sincere counteroffers when I am fairly
confident that my counter will be rejected. For example, I am troubled by the
unwillingness of most newspapers to compensate people who have been
harmed by negligent misrepresentation in the publications. So when I am
initially inclined to turn down an interview request, I sometimes respond by
counteroffering:
I would be happy to be interviewed. But I am concerned about the
ability of the print media to harm public and non-public figures by negligent
misrepresentations of fact without compensating them for their injury. I
therefore propose the following contract that I have offered in the past:
Agreement to Compensate for Negligent Misrepresentation
In this agreement: shall be referred to as "the reporter";
_ shall be referred to as "the publication"; and shall be
referred to as "the source."
In return for the participation of the source as an interviewee, the
publication promises to compensate anyone who is damaged by a factual
misrepresentation printed in an article that expressly quotes the source.
Compensation for factual misrepresentations is to be measured by the dollar
amount required to make the damaged person whole, but in no event shall
be less than $100. Damages might be mitigated by timely retractions of the
misrepresentation. Anyone explicitly named in the article is an express
third-party beneficiary of this contract and thereby has a right to directly sue
the publication if it breaches its promise to compensate. The publication and
the source intend for this to be a legally binding agreement. The reporter in
agreeing to this contract on behalf of the publication represents that the
reporter has actual and apparent authority to enter into this contract on
behalf of the publication.
To accept this contractual offer (and thereby create a legally binding
contract between the publication and the source), please reply to this email
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with a subject line that states "On behalf of the publication, I accept the
Agreement to Compensate for Negligent Misrepresentation."
No reporter has ever accepted this counteroffer. But again, I feel better
knowing that we did not do the interview because of their unwillingness to
compensate victims of their negligent misrepresentation than because of my
unwillingness to donate time to the free press.
C. Counteroffer as Screen
Many of these counteroffer examples can be seen as screening devices. I
would not want to contract with an employer who is willing to discriminate
against employees on the basis of sexual orientation or a newspaper that is
unwilling to compensate people who have been harmed by the newspaper's
negligence. But in other contexts, I use counteroffer screens to make sure
that the offeror has requisite knowledge in the subject at hand. When a stock
broker cold calls me and offers to give me investment advice, I often
counteroffer by saying, I'll give you ten minutes of my time if you can tell
me the beta on a well-diversified portfolio of NYSE equities. If the broker
does not know that the answer is 1 (and fewer than 5% of cold callers do),
then I do not want to talk.
Similarly, when Christians knock on my door offering spiritual advice, I
often counter by saying, "I will give you twenty minutes of my time if you
can answer five questions about the Bible (such as, who was the first person
in the Bible to become drunk?)." Again, the counteroffer is a screen. I do not
want to learn about the Bible from someone who might know less than I do.
For me, it has helped to cultivate a never-say-no attitude by thinking of the
negotiation process itself as an opportunity to collect data about the world.
This in itself is integrative. When I hear an offer that does not meet my
reservation conditions, I try to think what else this person has that I value,
and the social science answer for me is often data.
I could go on and on. When my seven-year-old daughter pleaded for a
puppy, my first reaction was to say, "Hell, no!" Our family travels a lot. Our
lives are very full. It would be a huge burden to have to take care of a puppy.
But instead of rejecting her offer out of hand, I thought long and hard about
what Anna could do that would make getting a puppy worthwhile. In the end,
I looked her in the eyes and said, "You can have a puppy if you publish an
article in a peer-reviewed academic journal." You might think this was just a
cruel and obnoxious way of saying "no." But I then worked with Anna and
her older brother for the next two years-first teaching them statistics and
then supervising their work on fairly sophisticated statistical study. Thanks to
the never-say-no impulse, Anna, Henry, and I are now published in a journal
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of the American Statistical Association. 21 And our family is the proud owner
of Cheby, a mongrel named after the great statistician, Pafnuty Chebyshev.
Imagine a world where law school admission offices literally never said
no. Instead of rejecting candidates, they would counteroffer with different
tuition prices: "You can still come to Yale, but with that abysmal LSAT
score, you are going to need to pay $5 million in tuition." Most of the less
qualified applicants would turn down the school's exorbitant counteroffer
(and applicants' willingness to pay would importantly depend on whether
future employers would learn the identity of these special admits). But if just
a few counteroffers were accepted, a policy of universal admission-really
universal counteroffers-might allow a law school to radically reduce the
cost of going to school for the rest of the class. 22 I do not expect to see this
thought-experiment coming into practice at law school anytime soon. But the
point of these examples is to hammer home a point that ADR scholars have
been pushing for a long time: in real world settings, there can be tremendous
gains from using counteroffers to explore whether there are as of yet
undiscovered gains of trade.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have tried here to tentatively argue that offerees should work against
their first impulse to reject non-overlapping offers. Cultivating a never-say-
no impulse can smoke out hidden gains of trade. Especially in contexts where
you will feel guilty turning down the other side's offer, countering with
sincere, alternative terms is a way to mitigate psychological discomfort
regardless of whether your counteroffer is accepted.
But I have also suggested contexts where the law might want to dampen
the impulse to counteroffer. Distributional counteroffers that follow
overlapping offers stand on a very different footing than either distributional
counteroffers following non-overlapping offers or integrative counteroffers.
An offeree who hears an overlapping offer is uniquely situated to economize
on negotiation costs by simply accepting the offer. Distributionally
counteroffering after you know there are gains of trade is, from this ex post
perspective, presumptively inefficient. Further distributional negotiation may
21 Ian Ayres, Antonia R. Ayres-Brown & Henry J. Ayres-Brown, Seeing
Significance: Is the 95% Probability Range Easier to Perceive?, 20 CHANCE 11 (Winter
2007).
22 The risk that too many applicants would accept the counteroffer is not a good
objection. A school could just raise the price of the offered tuition for those who would
have been rejected or delay a bit the timing of the counteroffers until the school has the
risk under control.
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be justified by equity or ex ante efficiency concerns. Esau might have been
justified in counteroffering even if he realizes that there are gains from trade
in selling his birthright for food, not just because a better price might be more
equitable, but it might have given Esau better incentives to create the trading
opportunity in the first place.
The larger goal of this talk has been to start a conversation into the
micro-foundations of negotiation. Methodologically, I hope to have
convinced you that it is useful to freeze the conversation at the moment when
an offeree first hears an offer and to think about economic and psychological
influences on the offeree's choice to accept, reject, or counter.
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